ABSTRACTS OF POINTS.

ligence because he did not foresee and prevent that which, as my
Brother Alderson says, was so remote that the cause of it could not
be found out for many months ? I think, therefore, that the judge
should have nonsuited the plaintiff; and if he refused to be nonsuited,
to have told the jury there was no evidence of negligence for them
to act on. Judgment for the defendants.

ABSTRACTS OF POINTS DETERMINED IN THE ENGLISH
COURTS OF COMMON LAW.

GODTS vs. RoSE.

17 Com. B. 229.

Sale of Goods-Property and iight of possession, how passed.
This was an action of trover, to recover a quantity of rape-oil.
The plaintiff having a quantity of rape-oil at Humphrey's wharf, contracted to sell five tons thereof to the defendant. The bought note was as
follows :-1"Bought for account of )ir. W. A. Rose, of ir. H. A. Godts,
five tons of first quality, foreign refined rape.oil, at 53s. per cwt., usual
.Jlowanecs; to be free delivered, and paid for in fourteen days, in cash,
less 2i per cent. discount."
The plaintiff sent an order to the wharf, directing the wharfinger to
transfer into the defendant's name five tons of the oil; and the wharfinger's clerk made the usual entry in his book, and gave the plaintiff's clerk
a transfer-order, addressed to the defendant, acknowledging to hold the
five!tons for him. The plaintiff's clerk took the invoice and transfer-order
to the defendant's counting-house, and offered them to him, at the same
time demanding a cheque for the amount. The defendant, without (as
the jury found) the consent of the plaintiff's clerk, took the transferorder, but refused to give a cheque. The clerk thereupon returned to the
wharf, and gave notice to the wharfinger not to deliver the oil to the defendant. In defiance, however, of this notice, the oil was afterwards delivered.
The Court of Common Pleas held that, under the circumstances, neither the property, nor the right to the possession thereof, passed to the
defendant.
"If it were necessary," says ir. Justice Willes, "to pronounce an
opinion upon, the construction of the contract, I should have little hesita-
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tion in holding it to be, that the seller should have the option of the time
of delivery, and that then the buyer should have the goods only upon payment of the price. I, however, proceed upon this ground, that the property in the oil was in the seller at the time of the contract, and that
nothing which took place between him and the buyer had the effect of
taking that property out of the former, and vesting it in the latter. This
was not a contract for the sale of any specific and ascertained parcel of oil
but for five tons out of any oil of the character specified. The contract is
simply a contract for the sale of five tons of oil of the description therein
mentioned. Now, when one man sells to another goods which are not
specifically defined, it is necessary that they should agree upon what is to
be delivered in fulfilment of the contract. The seller has the option of
delivering, and the buyer of accepting, goods of the kind mentioned, subject to their being of the quality contracted for. In the present case the
seller for the purpose of doing this, selects certain casks of oil as the oil
which he tenders to answer the contract on his part; and he sends his
clerk to the wharfinger with an order to him to hold these particular casks
for the buyer, which the wharfinger assents to do. Still, however, there
is no assent on the part of the buyer. The seller's clerk then goes to the
buyer, and producing the transfer-order he had obtained from the wharfinger, offers to give it to him, subject, however, to the condition that he
shall receive a cheque in return. The buyer takes the transfer-order, but
declines to give the cheque; he does not assent to the appropriation of the
particular casks of oil, as a falfilment of the contract, upon the terms upon
which alone the seller was content to make it. There was no agreement
ad idc, as to the appropriation, and consequently no property passed.
The law upon the subject of the passing of the property in goods by
appropriation is well laid down by Parke, B., in Dixon vs. Yates, 5
B. & Ad., 34, where he observes upon a note of my brother, Manning
II take it to be clear,' said the learned judge, that, by the law of England,
the sale of a specific chattel passes the property in it to a vendee, without
delivery. The general doctrine, that the property in chattels passes by
contract of sale to a vendee without delivery, is questioned in Bailey vs.
Cidverwill, 2 X1. & R. 566, in a note by the reporters; but I apprehend
the rule is correct as confined to a bargain for a specific chattel. Where
there is a sale of goods generally, no property in them passes till delivery,
because until then the very goods sold are not ascertained; but where by
the contract itself, the vendor appropriates to the vendee a specific chattel,
and the latter thereby agrees to take the specific chattel, and to pay the

